Israel-Hamas conflict - Escalation Scenarios: Lebanon, Iran… Ukraine?
Lots of debate, understandably, about possible escalation of the conflict once Israel’s ground offensive in Gaza begins. Fuelled of course by public statements from Iran.
Some thoughts on factors that will influence some key escalation, and containment, scenarios:-
Worth remembering that Hizbollah has not sought conflict with Israel since 2006, indeed it has actively staying out of each of the subsequent Israel-Hamas conflicts (2008/9, 2012, 2014, etc). This was largely because Iran instructed them to - a combination of GFC, low oil prices and crippling sanctions (i.e. liquidity) limited Iran’s capacity to re-arm them. And I emphasise ‘re-arm’ - the issue is not whether Hizbollah has the ability to fight, the worry for Iran is whether they can re-arm them after a major conflict. That dynamic has not significantly changed - indeed the pressure from US + allies to come will in fact further exacerbate these dynamics.
There are real fears of a collapse of the Lebanese state - already on the economic, social and political cliff’s edge - which may or may not result in a new reality favourable to Iran.
The events of the last 11 days of course have dramatically changed other regional dynamics, and Hizbollah and Iran may feel the necessity to now ‘do something’, or at least be ‘seen to be doing something’. But for the reasons stated above Iran has reasons not to have Hizbollah ‘go all in’ - thus the very limited engagement/activity until now.
This will undoubtedly change when the Israel ground assault of Gaza begins, but whether Hizbollah (and Iran) will do more than launch missile barrages on Israeli population centres (or even do this), combined with current limited actions around the border area, is by no means a certainty.
There are also key international push-and-pull factors:-
United States - It is hugely influential on Hizbollah and Iranian decision-making that the US has deployed its military might right off the coast, and directly (inc. Biden himself) warned that it will be used if Hizbollah joins Hamas in the fight. Cruise missiles hitting Hizbollah in Lebanon, or Iranian assets in Syria, can’t be ignored. This said, direct US military intervention on the ground remains unlikely unless there is major escalation - the US hardly has a positive history of intervening in Lebanon (and that is putting it mildly!), something US planners are all too aware of.
Russia/Ukraine - Iran however will take confidence from the fact the the Russians ‘owe’ them for their military support of Putin in Ukraine, and that Putin would love nothing more than see the US dragged into an unpopular conflict in the Middle-East. The more military assets it has to deploy, and to give to Israel, the less that gets given to Ukraine, with the focus of the US military and politicians increasingly moving away from supporting Ukraine.
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